

On September 21, at President Kennedy's request, Captain Tazewell Shepard, the President's Naval Aide, obtained a report from Feldman on Johnson Plan developments. Shepard reported that during the previous day Feldman had met with Meir, Joseph Johnson, and three groups of Jewish community leaders from Boston and New York and that Feldman "cannot stress too strongly his firm conviction that the faster you disengage from this plan the better. Otherwise he feels there will be a violent eruption both domestically and in our relations with Israel." Shepard added that "Feldman has suggestions as to how this should be done which he is prepared to discuss with you." (Memorandum from Shepard to the President, September 21; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Palestine, Refugees, Vol. II, 8/62-9/62) A handwritten note by Shepard on his memorandum indicates that Kennedy subsequently talked with Feldman and that Kennedy had a Komer memorandum (presumably that of September 22, Document 52) that took a contrary position.

An undated handwritten note from Schlesinger to Kennedy sent at approximately this time reads: "Apparently we are again going to have trouble at the U.N. on the Israeli matter. A large delegation of Jewish leaders called on me today expressing concern about the situation. Would you have a few minutes after lunch to talk about this? We ought to avoid a repetition of last year's problem with Adlai." (Ibid., President's Office Files, Countries Series, Israel)

---

51. Paper by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Seelye)

Washington, September 20, 1962.

DEATH OF IMAM AHMED BIN YAHYA

1. *Implications.* We have long feared that the death of Imam Ahmed might prove to be the spark setting off severe internal disturbances in

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H. 11/9-2162. Secret. Cleared by Harold W. Glidden of INR. Forwarded to Bundy on September 21 under cover of a brief memorandum from Brubeck indicating that the paper might be of interest to President Kennedy. An attached summary noted that the Imam's death could cause severe disturbances in Yemen and that Crown Prince Badr, who had expressed partiality to the Soviet bloc but proclaimed "positive neutralism," was weak and had little support. It advised: "We believe the U.S. should avoid involving itself in a Yemeni power struggle unless Yemen should veer too far in the direction of the Sino-Soviet Bloc."